In for a Penny, or: If you Disapprove of Investment Migration, Why Do You Approve of High-Skilled Migration? by Erez, Lior
 1 
 
In for a Penny, or:  If You Disapprove of 
Investment Migration, Why Do You 
Approve of High-Skilled Migration?  
 
Lior Erez, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
Forthcoming in Moral Philosophy & Politics 
 
Abstract: While many argue investment-based criteria for immigration are wrong or 
at least problematic, skill-based criteria remain relatively uncontroversial. This is 
normatively inconsistent. This article assesses three prominent normative objections 
to investment-based selection criteria for immigrants: (i) that they wrongfully 
discriminate between prospective immigrants (ii) that they are unfair, and (iii) that 
they undermine political equality among citizens. It argues that either skill-based 
criteria are equally susceptible to these objections, or that investment-based criteria 
are equally shielded from them. Indeed, in some ways investment-based criteria are 
less normatively problematic than skill-based criteria. Given this analysis, the 
resistance to investment-based migration criteria, but not to skill-based criteria, is 
inconsistent. 
Keywords: Discrimination; Ethics of Immigration; Equality of Opportunity; 
Investment Migration; Political Equality 
1. Introduction 
Much of the existing normative literature on migration has revolved around the 
question of exclusion and the rights of the excluded: the desirability and feasibility of 
open borders, the rights of refugees and other vulnerable groups to enter, and the 
different justifications for states to limit immigration (cf. Fine and Ypi 2016; Ferracioli 
2017). Yet two emerging patterns in global migration – skill-based and investment-
based migration – highlight strikingly different questions. In contrast with the image 
of states struggling to restrict immigration, skill- and investment-based immigrants 
are welcomed, actively recruited, and indeed fought over by states.  
Skill-based migration is the more visible trend, as more and more states are engaging 
in the intense global competition to attract internationally mobile human capital. 
Czaika and Parsons estimate that ‘two-thirds of OECD nations having implemented, 
or [are] in the process of implementing, policies specifically aiming to attract high-
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skilled migrants’ (2017, p. 604). Less visible is the growing number of states offering 
‘golden visas’, permanent residence, and sometimes even full citizenship status, in 
exchange for investment (in real-estate, sovereign development funds, or local 
business). In the European Union, about half of member states now have dedicated 
investor migration routes, with Malta and Cyprus offering (controversial) citizenship-
by-investment. Similar programs exist, or are under development, in other parts of the 
world as well.  
Scholars have rightly pointed out that these two trends are related through a changing 
attitude of states to migration, the influence of globalization, and the rise of a mobile 
transnational elite (Van Fossen 2007; Shachar and Hirschl 2014; Abrahamian 2015; 
Parker 2017; Džankić 2019). Both are instances of discretionary migration policies: 
unlike refugees and asylum seekers, or particular cases of family reunification, these 
are cases where states are assumed to hold the right to select prospective immigrants. 
Yet, interestingly, while skill-based migration is generally seen, both in the public 
discourse and in most of the academic scholarship, as desired and uncontroversial – 
with skill-based criteria (hereafter SBC) sometimes as the only legitimate criteria for 
selection (Joppke 2005) – investment-based criteria (hereafter: IBC) have been met 
with an overwhelming resistance. While defences of the practice do exist (Borna and 
Stearns 2002; Becker and Lazear 2013; Hidalgo 2016), the general consensus is that 
selecting immigrants by their ability to pay is problematic, or at least more 
problematic than selecting immigrants by skill (Johnston 2013; Shachar and Hirschl 
2014; Shachar 2017; Shachar 2018; Tanasoca 2018). As even those who are sceptical 
about the merits of skill-based migration write, ‘The emphasis on skills and talent is 
certainly preferable to using the size of applicants’ wallets to determine who to bring 
in and who to keep out’ (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, p. 253). 
In this paper, I argue that this common view is unfounded and inconsistent. By 
examining three prominent normative objections to IBC, I show that (i) these 
objections apply to SBC equally, or even to a greater degree, and (ii) insofar as 
defenders of SBC are able to accommodate these objections, these accommodations 
apply equally (and sometimes more so) to IBC. This is not intended as a condemnation 
of SBC nor as approbation of IBC; I merely argue that endorsing the former should 
lead one, on pain of inconsistency, to endorse the latter (and vice versa). The position 
I am arguing against is the one that finds SBC acceptable and IBC unacceptable.   
I will first provide the preliminary background assumptions for the comparison. In 
the following sections, I will explore three possible dimensions in which selective 
criteria for discretionary immigration are criticised: whether they wrongfully 
discriminate, or are unfair to, prospective unselected immigrants; or whether they 
wrong existing citizens in immigration-receiving states by violating political equality. 
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In each of these categories, I will argue that IBC does not fare worse, and in some cases 
fares better, than SBC.  
The list of objections I consider below is not exhaustive, and there are two significant 
omissions I wish to explicitly point out. One important objection not directly 
addressed in this analysis appeals to the ethical limits of commodification, arguing 
that political membership is intrinsically ‘not for sale’ (e.g. Shachar 2017, pp.806f).  
While I am sceptical about such intrinsic arguments (cf. Brennan and Jaworski 2015), 
defending this scepticism is beyond the scope of my argument. I do, however, address 
the non-intrinsic case against selling citizenship when discussing arguments 
appealing to Walzerian complex equality (in 4.2.), and expressive harm (in 5.2.).  
I will also, for limits of scope, focus only on arguments relating to the prospective 
immigrants and the citizens of the receiving state, and not discuss the important 
question of the potential externalities of these policies on migration-sending states and 
their non-migrant population.  This omission is warranted, I hope, given the fact that 
such externalities of SBC – e.g., the human capital flight implications of skill-based 
emigration (the ‘brain drain’ question) – are already well discussed and visible in the 
literature (Brock and Blake 2014). An analogous argument could be made with regards 
to IBC as a method of tax evasion by the wealthy. My aim in this article, however, is 
to demonstrate how objections to IBC can be applied to SBC, and not the other way 
around.  
2. Preliminary Assumptions 
Before turning to the comparative evaluation of SBC and IBC, it will be helpful to 
explicitly state the background assumptions I will be employing in this analysis.1 
Throughout, I will assume that (1) states have the presumptive right to limit 
immigration, and while (2) this power to exclude prospective immigrants is 
constrained by considerations of human rights and legitimacy (for example, vis-à-vis 
refugees), (3) both skill-based migration and investment-based migration are open to 
the discretion of states, under weaker constraints of justification. In order to assess 
whether these selection criteria meet the burden of justification, we have to (4) assume 
all other features of these policies being equal.  
The rationale for endorsing these assumptions is both tactical and methodological. 
First, the first three assumptions conform to what I take to be the mainstream position 
in the ethics of migration policy, encompassing a wide spectrum of the theoretical 
                                                 
1 These assumptions are not self-evident; for prominent methodological critiques of their implicit 
acceptance in most of the ethical literature on migration, see (Cole 2014; Sager 2016). My aim in this 
article is not to defend these assumptions. 
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positions in the literature (though not all – as I explain below, I do not address the 
open borders position, for example). By working from widely accepted assumptions, 
I hope to make my conclusion more compelling. Second, working from these four 
background assumptions allows me to make the case that objections to IBC apply 
equally to SBC, without arriving at this conclusion by fiat. Let us now turn to explain 
each of the four assumption in more detail. 
(1) First, my analysis assumes that states have a presumptive right to impose at least 
some limits on immigration. This assumption could be interpreted more or less 
broadly, of course, but it is meant to exclude the ‘open border’ position: that freedom 
of movement across borders ought to be free, or that there is a general human right to 
immigrate.  
As I mentioned above, one motivation for this assumption is ecumenical, as the open 
border argument is a contested position within immigration ethics. However, my 
exclusion of the open borders assumption is methodological, not substantive. 
Accepting that there is a strong right to global freedom of movement would obviate 
the comparison between SBC and IBC, or indeed between any discretionary selection 
criteria whatsoever; they would all be prohibited. In other words, the argument I wish 
to defend – that the different evaluation of SBC and IBC is inconsistent –  will be 
confirmed by definition.  
(2) Second, the presumptive right to impose limits on immigration is not absolute and 
is not entirely open to the unilateral discretion of states. Considerations of human 
rights, with regards to general claims of refugees and asylum seekers, and particular 
claims of family reunification, are seen grounding strong rights to migrate, and 
constrain the state's right to exclude.  
It is important to note that unlike the argument for open borders, which is endorsed 
by at least some normative theorists, the absolute control argument is not supported 
by any normative theorist of which I am aware. Furthermore, this assumption is 
methodologically justified for the same reason as the previous one: if states have 
absolute authority to decide on the limits of immigration, then all selection criteria 
would be equally permitted.  
(3) I will moreover assume that claims of migrants considered under skill-based and 
investment-based migration policy do not pose strong constraints on the state’s right 
to exclude them, but that this right to exclude is still subject to demands of justification. 
This assumption could be stated as such: while it is within the state's right to exclude 
some or all potential immigrants who fall under this category, it is obliged to provide 
a justification in case it chooses to employ any selection criteria between prospective 
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immigrants. Assessing and comparing SBC and IBC, in other words, would involve 
considering whether the specific criteria are justifiable.  
But justifiable to whom? This is a complex question which can have more or less 
controversial answers. Least controversially, I will assume that immigration policy – 
as all public policy, at least in democracies – has to be justifiable to the state’s citizenry 
(Blake 2002, 2008).  In some cases, I will also assume that selection criteria should be 
justifiable to prospective migrants that will be excluded. This requirement of 
justification may arise from different foundations, for example, a weak cosmopolitan 
principle of equal respect to all (Miller 2016), an application of the all-affected 
principle in democratic theory (Goodin 2007), or from seeing immigration controls as 
a form of coercion, which has to be legitimated by justification (Abizadeh 2008). Each 
of these foundations will suggest a different threshold of sufficient justification, and it 
is well beyond the scope of this paper to adjudicate between them (cf. Yong 2017). For 
my purposes, I will apply the same level of required justification when considering 
objections to IBC and SBC. So, for example, if an objection to IBC supposes that it is 
unjustifiable to prospective immigrants because it does not meet justificatory 
threshold X, I will ask whether SBC meet this threshold.2  
(4) Fourth, and finally, in order to appropriately evaluate and compare the strength of 
justifications for SBC and IBC, we have to be able to compare like-for-like, and 
consider these selection criteria on equal basis. I highlight this necessity because of the 
unfortunate tendency of some writers to support their case against IBC by 
compounding the supposed wrongs of the practice, while at the same time evaluating 
SBC according to its best interpretation. A fair assessment of these policies should not 
take into account, for example, accusations of democratic illegitimacy of investor-
based migration, as was made by the Maltese opposition in 2014; if true, that would 
certainly constitute a wrong, but not one necessarily due to the selection criterion 
itself. One must also avoid turning to slippery slope argument, conflating 
discretionary selection of immigrants according to the ability to pay (‘golden visas’), 
the exchange of citizenship for investment without any residency requirements, and 
the outright commodification of citizenship in an open market. Given that for each of 
these variations there is an equivalent policy based on selection by skill (for example, 
the quick naturalisation of Olympic athletes), comparing uncontroversial admissions 
of high-skilled workers to the radical and hypothetical barter of citizenship dreamt up 
by some economists would only serve to make comparison less clear.  
With these preliminary assumptions stated, I turn now to investigate potential 
burdens of justifications for selection criteria in migration. 
                                                 
2 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this point. 
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3. The Wrongful Discrimination Objection 
In its motion on the question of citizenship for sale, the European Parliament stated 
that ‘concerns exist as regards possible discrimination because these practices by 
Member States only allow the richest third-country nationals to obtain EU citizenship, 
without any other criteria being considered’ (European Parliament 2014). Clearly, IBC 
discriminate between prospective migrants: it discriminates between those able to pay 
and those who are not able.  
Interpreted this broadly, the claim is both trivial and too general: all selection criteria 
would be discriminating in this sense, including SBC (they would discriminate 
between the skilled and the unskilled). This is not sufficient for demonstrating that 
investment-based criteria are wrongfully discriminating. As Javier Hidalgo writes,  
When people sell luxury cars, mansions, or expensive antique furniture, they 
discriminate against poor people. These people in effect treat poor people 
worse than rich people by selling products that only rich people can afford. 
Nonetheless, it appears permissible to sell luxury goods to rich people (2016, p. 
236). 
We of course do consider certain selection criteria for immigrants to be wrongfully 
discriminatory. Article 26 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
prohibits discrimination on grounds such as ‘race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. 
Most theorists who justify the state's right to exclude also accept that the state is not 
permitted to exclude prospective immigrants based on their ethnicity, gender, or 
religion – while admittedly the question of language and place of birth is murkier.3 
But on what grounds are these criteria wrongfully discriminatory, and can skill- and 
investment-based criteria be analogously held to be wrongful?  
In order to answer this question, I turn to the philosophical literature on the concept 
of wrongful discrimination, and the proposed accounts of the wrongfulness of 
discrimination: following Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s typology (2014), I will 
consider three prominent accounts: the Mental State based account, the Objective 
Meaning account, and the Harm based account. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
defend any of these accounts as the primary ground for the wrongness of 
discrimination, either with regards to particular wrongness of race-based criteria for 
                                                 
3 See works by David Miller (2016), Christopher Wellman (2011), Ryan Pevnick (2011) , Michael Blake 
(2002), with Michael Walzer (1983) as the most prominent counterexample. Wellman believes that these 
criteria are wrong, but interestingly writes that ‘I must confess, however, that I find it surprisingly 
difficult to provide an entirely satisfying argument for this conclusion’ (2011, p. 144). 
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selecting immigrants or the broader concept. Suffice to show that whatever account 
one finds most convincing, it applies equally to SBC and IBC. 
3.1. Mental State  
Mental State Based accounts of discrimination, such as that defended in an influential 
article by Larry Alexander, maintain that what makes discrimination wrong is the 
wrongful mental state (e.g. one's attitude, motive, or intention) of the discriminator: 
the thought that the one discriminated against was of inferior moral worth (Alexander 
1992).4 Since all people are of equal moral worth, this expresses the wrong view, and 
is disrespectful. So for race-based selection criteria, one may argue that they are wrong 
since they are motivated by the false belief that, in the example of the American 
Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese prospective immigrants are morally inferior to 
whites.5 A related thought is expressed by David Miller, who writes that ‘to be told 
that they are the wrong race, or sex (or have the wrong hair color) is insulting [to 
prospective immigrants], given that these features do not connect to anything of real 
significance to the society they want to join’.6  
But this account does not easily apply to the selection criteria I am considering here. 
The paradigmatic example in this account is an employer hiring a lesser skilled 
candidate because of a false belief about moral superiority based on race.7 But for both 
SBC and IBC, the analogy does not hold. While it is true that states have, in the past, 
designed immigration policies with the expressed intent of excluding some groups 
perceived as morally inferior, it is less clear that the state must hold any view on the 
moral worth of prospective immigrants by using economic criteria: instead, it only 
needs to take into account the economic benefit they would bring its society. If we 
analogise selecting between prospective immigrants to selecting job candidates, then 
these criteria are permissible in the same way that hiring someone who would bring 
more useful skills to the company (the equivalent of SBC) or someone who would be 
less costly (the equivalent of IBC) are permissible.  Douglas MacKay argues that, since 
‘[e]conomic success is a legitimate aim of government because it can be reasonably 
expected to facilitate the realization of states’ legitimate purposes in securing and 
                                                 
4 Note however, that in more recent writing Alexander explicitly rejects this account (and indeed, all 
philosophical accounts) of the wrongness of discrimination (Alexander 2016).  
5 ‘The popular and intellectual debates regarding migration and naturalization were framed in racial 
terms. For instance, Chinese laborers were maligned as “docile”, “servile”, and “unfit” for self-
government.’ (Fine 2016) 
6 Strictly speaking, this is not the same as Alexander's argument, as it focuses on the subjective mental 
state of the discriminated rather than the discriminator. For my purposes I can ignore this difference.  
7 See also David Miller's Meritocratic Account (1992, p. 161): ‘Justice demands that the job be offered to 
the best-qualified applicant. We express this by saying that the best-qualified applicant deserves the 
job or, in a slightly different formulation, that the principle involved is one of merit. This is the principle 
that condemns discrimination on grounds of sex, race or religion when hiring employees.’ 
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promoting the freedom, health, and well-being of their citizens’, the economic 
contribution potential of prospective immigrants does ‘connect to real significance to 
the society’ (MacKay 2016, p. 133). Therefore, unlike a claim about the moral 
superiority of others, MacKay argues that ‘[s]tates’ interests in economic success and 
political integration are reasons prospective immigrants cannot reasonably reject as 
bases for differentiation’ (2016, p. 129). 
One may challenge the assumption that IBC are indeed in the state's economic interest.  
Shachar has pointed, for example, to the ‘disappointing results’ of the Canadian 
investment visa scheme, and other investment based programmes (Shachar 2017, pp. 
801f). Whether this conclusion is generalizable to all investment migration schemes is 
open to empirical contestation, but nevertheless, if it holds it would suggest that the 
selection criteria reflect unjustified bias as opposed to justified self-interested. Note 
however that if this argument is persuasive, SBC may be no less problematic than IBC. 
As Higgins argues, ‘[a] great deal of empirical research supports the view that the net 
impact of immigration (even of the ‘unskilled’) for the economies of relatively wealthy 
receiving countries is positive in the aggregate’ (2013, p. 202 [emphasis added]). If the 
exclusion of low-skilled migrants is justified by claims that, unlike high-skilled 
migrants, they will be a fiscal burden on the welfare state or that they will drive down 
wages for native workers, the empirical evidence for these claims is contested (see 
Borjas 2014; Card and Peri 2016; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).    
Whether or not these are reasons that prospective immigrants cannot reasonably 
reject, it may be that, subjectively, unselected prospective migrants would be insulted 
by the reasons for which they have not been selected, or find these reasons 
disrespectful. Ana Tanasoca, in her consideration of this question, argues that 
‘discriminating on the basis of education is less degrading than discriminating on the 
basis of money: at least education is a deeper and more stable attribute of the person, 
unlike merely contingent and perhaps fleeting facts about his pocket’ (Tanasoca 2018, 
p. 66). But it is hard to see why.  ‘Unskilled’ workers may be insulted by the state's 
policy, either because ‘they find it judges their worth to the society on the basis of a 
factor beyond their control, or deems them less valuable contributors to the 
community, thereby undermining their self-esteem’ (Fine 2016, p. 144).  
Indeed, one may even have the reverse intuition: discrimination on the basis of 
education is more degrading than discrimination on the basis of financial status, 
precisely because the former is based on enduring features of the person. Tanasoca 
(2018, pp.66f, fn 42) concedes this intuition with regards to enduring attributes that an 
agent cannot voluntarily acquire or avoid (either because they are ascribed attributes 
beyond its control, like race or sexual orientation, or the result of structural injustice 
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and lack of opportunities), and so is not responsible for them.8 But that is ‘obviously 
not the case with education’, which is therefore less arbitrary than financial status.  But 
this dichotomy is unconvincing: it is simply not the case that, categorically, one is 
more responsible for one’s skills and talents than for one’s financial status. Individual 
status of wealth and education are similarly attributed to family background, class 
privilege, arbitrary psychological dispositions, and structural inequality, not merely 
personal choice or brute luck. That one is a more enduring fact about the person does 
not make it less morally arbitrary. In any case, policies based on SBC or IBC do not 
generally inquire into the causes of one’s education or wealth.    
3.2. Objective Meaning 
The second account of the wrongness of discrimination is the Objective Meaning 
account, as defended by Deborah Hellman (2008). This account grounds the wrong of 
discrimination in the meaning expressed by such actions within a particular social 
context; specifically, that discriminating actions are demeaning to affected parties, 
expressing that the relevant individual and social group to which she belongs are not 
‘fully human’. Thus, for example, Carens's justification for ruling out race, ethnicity, 
religion, and sexual orientation as permissible selection criteria is that such exclusions 
would violate a liberal democratic norm against ‘stigmatizing form[s] of 
discrimination’, reflecting ‘popular prejudice and uninformed fear rather than a 
reasonable calculation of the risks and burdens they entail’ (Carens 2013, p. 179). 
Is it the case, then, that IBC are wrongfully discriminatory because their demeaning 
social meaning, even when this is not explicitly expressed by the state, or subjectively 
felt by immigrants? In a critique of Carens's account of social stigma as the root of the 
wrongness of discrimination, Arash Abizadeh (2014) argues that this is an open 
question: ‘why is it impermissible to discriminate on the basis of religion in the name 
of the public interest, but permissible do so on the basis of poverty or social class?’.  
The poor, as a social class, are after all no less stigmatised, or thought of as inferior, 
than ethnic or sexual minorities. It is possible to argue, furthermore, that even when 
selection criteria are based on ‘neutral’ metrics such as the ability to pay, in an unequal 
world wealth would in fact be a proxy for certain racial, ethnic, or gendered traits. The 
fact that whites, as a group, have more wealth, status, and political influence ‘is not 
the result of differential innate ability, or a greater degree of industriousness, but is 
the outcome of several hundred years of transnational as well as intra-national… 
exploitation, manifest both in greater resources for whites as a racial group… and 
national and transnational structures which favor whites locally and the European 
and Euro-settler states globally’ (Mills, 2015). 
                                                 
8 A similar challenge was posed to me by an anonymous reviewer. 
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But if these arguments against IBC are persuasive, then clearly they apply to SBC as 
well. Desiree Lim, building on Hellman's expressive theory of discrimination, argues 
that talent-migration in the existing context is a form of wrongful discrimination 
because it generates a binary with regards the kind of people desired by the society, 
with low-skilled immigrants as a stand in for undesired foreigners (Lim 2017). Even if 
the policies themselves are not motivated by xenophobia, they send a social signal 
about the social traits of foreign unskilled immigrants and their status as a burden on 
society. Some have made a more radical claim, arguing that SBC reflect a particular 
value-laden hierarchy of particular skills, elevating male-dominated fields over 
female-dominated care work, or skills values in the capitalist west over skills valued 
in other cultures (Tannock 2011).  
3.3. Harm 
Finally, a third possible account of the wrongfulness of discrimination is a 
consequentialist one. As defended by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen: 
an instance of discrimination is wrong, when it is, because it makes people 
worse off, i.e., they are worse off given the presence of discrimination than they 
would have been in some suitable alternative situation in which the relevant 
instance of discrimination had not taken place (Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, p. 
154f).  
Race-based selection criteria, therefore, may be wrongfully discriminating when they 
are harmful to the most vulnerable groups: due to discrimination, they are worse off 
than they would be in a just world. For example, as Higgins writes, ‘virtually all past 
or ongoing exclusions on the basis of (imagined) race, religion, and sexual preference 
are plainly unjust’, because the denial of admission has avoidably harmed the 
excluded vulnerable groups (2013, p. 208). 
With regards to SBC and IBC, the harm-based account is ambiguous. Whether or not 
the unselected prospective immigrants are harmed by the policy would depend on 
the baseline for assessing harm. Presumably, since they are voluntarily applying to be 
admitted, they at least believe they would be better off if admitted to the selecting 
state, and so are worse off compared to that counterfactual. Yet that is an implausible 
place to set baseline, as it will set all cases of discrimination as wrongful. More 
importantly, if this baseline is accepted, it does not allow a distinction between SBC 
and IBC.    
Moralizing the baseline complicates things further. As I stated in my preliminary 
assumptions, the case in question is one of discretionary migration where state is not 
under obligation to accept any of the prospective immigrants, although it is required 
to provide a justification for excluding them. In other words, since a possible world in 
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which the state uses its discretion to admit no further immigrants is not unjust, the 
prospective immigrant cannot be said to be harmed by the selection criteria: the state 
was not under duty to admit them. The criteria specified in different policies of SBC 
and IBC migration provide the justification for exclusion. Not all justifications are 
created equal, of course; but unless we can explain why SBC are justifiable criteria 
while IBC are unjustifiable, our judgement with regards to the harms imposed by the 
two policies should be the same. 
4. The Equality of Opportunity Objection 
4.1. Global Equality of Opportunity 
IBC may be wrong not because they are wrongfully discriminatory, but because they 
are unfair.9 Chris Armstrong (2018, p.  27) suggests this possibility when he writes that 
‘perhaps it is unfair to allow people to buy citizenship, because other less fortunate 
outsiders are thereby disadvantaged... The playing-field is simply not even’.10 
Similarly, Tanasoca (2018, p. 66) writes that investor citizenship is unjust because ‘[a]ll 
otherwise identically situated individuals should have equal opportunities of 
becoming citizens, no matter their financial situation ‘. 
It is not obvious, however, that even if we accept a strong global principle of equality 
of opportunity, all individuals should have an equal opportunity to become citizens 
of a particular state. Even cosmopolitan supporters of global equality of opportunity 
do not endorse this position. Simon Caney, for example, argues that we should aim 
not to secure equal access to the same positions, but for equal opportunity to fill social 
positions of equal value in terms of the rewards attached to them (Caney 2001). And 
to reiterate the background assumptions of this discussion: the prospective 
immigrants in question do not have a particular right to be admitted to the selecting 
state, so it does not follow that they should have an equal opportunity to be admitted. 
Given that investment-based migration is not the sole route for migration, it is not 
clear why it is problematic that ‘investor citizenship makes available to the rich and 
only to the rich an extra naturalization route, over and above the standard one that is 
available to the rich and poor alike’ (Tanasoca 2018, p. 66). 
Even if we accept this line of thought, Tanasoca's argument seems ad-hoc; it is not 
clear in what sense two individuals with different financial situations are ‘identically 
                                                 
9 Whether wrongful discrimination should be defined in terms of inequality of opportunity is a 
contested position; see (Segall 2012, p. 83, fn4) for the claim that this position is almost universally 
rejected amongst theorists of discrimination.  
10 Note that Armstrong only proposes this argument, but does not endorse it; he recognizes that this 
objection is not to selling citizenship per se, but to facilitating easy access to the wealthy, as well as the 
skilful.  
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situated’. This already assumes that the ability to pay more is irrelevant to the question 
of equal opportunity, which is the desired conclusion. Why, in other words, couldn't 
Tanasoca write that SBC are unjust because ‘all otherwise identically situated 
individuals should arguably have an equal opportunity of becoming citizens, 
regardless of their levels of education, or their profession’? 
4.2. Complex Equality 
A more sophisticated version of this argument, defended by Ayelet Shachar, is that  
‘turning citizenship into a money-based prize also contradicts any Walzerian-like 
notion of complex equality according to which advantage in one sphere (here, wealth) 
cannot be legitimately transferred to another (in this case, membership)’ (Shachar 
2018, p. 13). For the sake of argument, I will set aside the question of whether complex 
equality as distributive principle can be thought to apply globally, and not, as Walzer 
conceived it, as restricted to a bounded community with shared understandings of the 
meaning of social goods.11  I also accept that, for the sake of argument, membership 
can be conceived as one of the goods or spheres in question, as opposed to being the 
background assumption against which the demand for complex equality arises (Miller 
1995).12  
Suppose then that we apply the ideal of complex equality to the question at hand. In 
defining complex equality, Walzer writes that ‘No social good X should be distributed 
to men and women who possess some other good Y merely because they possess Y 
and without regard to the meaning of X’ (Walzer 1983, p. 20).  For Shachar's argument 
to work, we need to replace ‘social good X’ with ‘political membership’; We need a 
theory of the meaning of political membership, and then decide what kind of 
distributive principle arises from this meaning; And then we need to show that 
selecting by the ability to pay (that is, exchanging wealth for political membership) 
violates this principle, whereas selecting by skill does not.  
The presumed problem with IBC, from the perspective of complex equality, is either 
that the distributive logic of allocating money is not the same as the one allocating 
citizenship (and so advantage in the sphere of the economy translates into advantage 
in the sphere of political membership); or that the distributive logic governing 
membership allocation is different than the market logic of free exchange, and thus 
allowing money to be exchanged for citizenship would entail the tyranny of market 
over citizenship. Shachar's own ground-breaking work, and her critique of birthright 
citizenship, suggests the latter interpretation: given the meaning of citizenship, it 
                                                 
11 For the argument that this is the implication of Walzer’s theory, see (Barry 1995; Miller 1995). 
12 This is a common assumption in anti-commodification arguments (e.g. Sandel, Anderson, and Satz), 
which makes their argument inapplicable to the question of whether citizenship itself could be for sale.  
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should allocated according to social connections (jus nexi). But if this is the case, SBC 
clearly also fall short. 
Shachar and Hirschl (2014) anticipate this objection, and attempt to evade it by 
offering a distinction between human capital and capital simpliciter. On the one hand, 
they maintain that selecting by the ability to pay is arbitrary: ‘there is no rational 
connection between delivering a stack of cash or sending in a bank wire transfer and 
establishing the kind of participation and equal standing among fellow citizens that 
the political bonds of membership are meant to represent and foster’ (2014, p. 250). 
But ‘a similar conclusion is not warranted’ with regards to high-skilled migration 
programs: IBC which ‘depend on the alienability and transferability of purely fungible 
funds, [SBC] focus on the distinctive skills, talents, or abilities ‘encapsulated’ in the 
recruited migrant herself who moves to the new country’. Human capital, unlike 
capital simpliciter, ‘is non-transferable and non-alienable; it is part of the self’, and so 
protected by considerations of personal liberty (2014, p. 251).  
However, recognising the conceptual distinction between non-transferable, non-
alienable, self-bounded human capital, on the one hand, and fungible, impersonal 
capital on the other hand, does not immediately entail that the former can legitimately 
serve as criteria for membership, but not the latter. MacKay (2016, p. 137) rightly 
points out that religion, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation are also non-alienable, 
non-transferable, identity-bound traits, but this in itself does not entail that they can 
serve as criteria for membership. Nor can the distinction be made on the basis that 
talent or skills are more conceptually connected to membership because their 
contribution extends over a longer time period (potentially, the lifespan of the person), 
whereas financial contribution can be made in a matter of seconds. As Armstrong 
(2018, 25f) argues, the significance and depth of contribution is not necessarily linked 
to the duration in which this contribution has taken place.  
We may concur with Paulina Ochoa (2018, pp. 45f), instead, that the deciding factor is 
physical presence. This is more persuasive: for human capital to be productive, it 
usually requires the presence of the individual, and is conceptually connected to 
residence and membership. But note that this is an objection to waiving residence 
requirements for membership, not to the kind of criteria used for selecting prospective 
immigrants. It will rule out passport-for-sale schemes (where investors become 
citizens without any residence requirements), but not golden visa programs, which 
grant residence rights. Interestingly, this kind of objection would also apply to certain 
(although admittedly rarer) SBC migration policies – for example, the naturalisation 
of Olympic athletes. 
We may alternatively think that given the social meaning of citizenship, it is 
appropriate to allocate it to those who have the greatest potential to become good 
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citizens. Having available the sums required to meet IBC is not an indication of 
citizenship potential, and so it is an illegitimate consideration. Along these lines, 
Tanasoca (2018, p. 67) argues that unlike the direct exchange of money for citizenship, 
‘one gets citizenship exclusively for performing well in naturalization tests, not 
directly for the diplomas hanging on one’s wall’. But this is misleading. We should 
not conflate civic education, or successful passing of a naturalisation test, with the 
kinds of educational requirements for meeting SBC. Most existing SBC reward skills 
required in the job market, not in the political sphere. Even if we accept a meritocratic 
principle of awarding citizenship, it is not clear why selecting for job market skills is 
more legitimate than selecting by ability to invest.   
So far I've been assuming that, as in the real world, investment-based immigration in 
addition to other forms of immigration, discretionary and non-discretionary. 
However, wouldn't it become wrongfully unfair if ‘the size of their wallets, and 
nothing else, distinguishes suitable from unsuitable candidates for initial entry and 
eventual citizenship’? (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, p. 250)13 If market logic completely 
takes over the admission of immigrants and the allocation of citizenship, would-be 
entrants who might have had a shot through standard migration streams would be 
‘priced out’, and ‘auction mechanisms and supply-and-demand rules may well 
replace our (however imperfect) procedures for ensuring some degree of 
accountability and collective decision-making on what it means to belong to a political 
community’ (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, p. 248). 
Yet it is important to avoid conflating selection by the ability to pay (as is already the 
case in existing investor-migrant schemes), and a complete capitulation of state 
sovereignty to market forces, as is imagined in this dystopian scenario. Even so, it is 
not obvious that investor migration would lead to a reduction in non-investor based 
migration. From a purely economic perspective, at least, the case is not settled. Javier 
Hidalgo (2016, p. 237, fn19), for example, argues that we should avoid thinking about 
immigration as a zero-sum game, and it is possible that adding investor migrants will 
increase the quota of migrants a state is willing to accept, given that it would now 
have more material resources. This is an empirical question, and as Hidalgo himself 
                                                 
13 See also on p. 251: ‘The problem, we believe, lies not in the selection of some migrants to join our 
political committees based on their extraordinary talent or potential to generate reputational gains and 
positive externalities. The different selection criteria for admitting newcomers—family based, 
humanitarian, and employment-based—serve different purposes and follow distinctive logics. There 
is no principled reason to presuppose that any of them, standing alone, can respond to the full spectrum 
of human motivation for mobility. The danger lies elsewhere: in the totalizing impact of turning talent 
and human capital into the make-or-break criteria for cross-border mobility, and the consequent 
emergence of a more stratified perception of membership goods as ‘Olympic laurels’ to be awarded by 
competitive nations only to those they covet most’. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to selection by 
investment.  
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concedes, in the absence of solid evidence ‘it is hard to say for sure whether selling 
citizenship would unfairly displace deserving applicants or not’. 
In any case, a world in which meeting SBC is the only route for admission would be 
equally damaging to the equality of opportunity. Indeed, there is compelling evidence 
that the rise of high-skilled migration schemes is correlated with new restrictions and 
conditionalities on low-skilled migration, as well as on supposedly non-discretionary 
admissions, such as family-based migration and asylum (Kofman 2018; Ellermann 
forthcoming). While it is true that ‘we must also be cautious not to assume a causal 
link between the instrumental and strategic considerations that fuel the fires of talent 
migration and the stricter mobility-curbing measures imposed upon other streams of 
migration’ (Shachar 2016), a similar logic fuels both the move to attract ‘the best and 
brightest’, and to restrict access of those considered a burden (Ypi 2018; Ellermann 
forthcoming).  
5. The Political Equality Objection 
So far I have been focusing on justificatory constraints on selection criteria with 
regards to prospective, unselected immigrants. Both the discrimination and equality 
of opportunity arguments assume that the state has a duty to treat prospective 
immigrants equally and fairly. The line of argument I turn to now is far less 
controversial: it only claims that the criteria for selecting prospective immigrants 
should be justifiable to the state's current citizens. As such, this is the line of thought 
endorsed by theorists of immigration most opposed to open borders (Blake 2002; 
Wellman and Cole 2011; Miller 2016). 
5.1. Basic Interests 
One possible line of argument is that selection criteria do not meet the burden of 
justification if they do not sufficiently protect current citizens' basic interests. Thus, for 
example, it is argued that the state is required to exclude potential immigrants if they 
have a criminal history, or, with regards to low-skilled immigrants, if their admission 
would have potential harmful effect on low-skilled domestic labour. But the case is 
much harder to substantiate either with regards to investment-based or skill-based 
selection criteria, where it is already assumed that the state is selecting by potential 
contribution to the economy. As I already argued above, whether any particular 
scheme actually delivers these expected results is a different question, but one that 
applies equally to both types of selection criteria.  
Particular instances of IBC may, of course, have harmful effects for current citizens. 
On June 2017, Canada announced that its electronic Travel authorisation (eTA) for 
citizens of Antigua and Barbuda will become null and void. Several media reports to 
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speculate the decision was motivated by the Antiguan Citizenship by Investment 
Program, in line with a similar decision to revoke St. Kitts and Nevis's no-visa travel. 
Shachar cites these cases as examples of ‘non-monetary sanction and suspicion that 
Kittians and Nevisians [and Antiguans] who have no other passport… must now bear’ 
(Shachar 2017, p. 803). But these harmful effects are contingent to investment-based 
criteria (no such measures were suggested against Malta, for example), and could 
equally arise from other immigration policies who were too lax in the view of third 
parties. 
5.2. Expressive Harm  
A more foundational way to conceive the wrongs to current citizens is to focus on the 
expressive harms of immigration law in general, and selection criteria in particular, 
on current citizens. Within normative political theory, Michael Blake endorses this 
argument as an explanation of the wrongness of race-based selection criteria. These 
are wrong not because they are discriminatory towards prospective immigrants, he 
argued, but because they reflect a message of racial favoritism on behalf of the state. 
This is doubly wrong, as ‘this statement undermines the ability of citizens with the 
disfavored racial identity to see themselves as full participants in the project of self-
rule’, and undermines the political equality of fellow citizens within the state (Blake 
2002, 284). Within legal theory, Adam Cox analogises immigration law to redistricting 
laws, both concerning the regulation of political community boundaries, and relies on 
the supreme court ruling against racial gerrymandering in Shaw vs Reno to conclude 
that ‘immigration laws could regulate the boundaries of the national political 
community in a fashion that expresses a constitutionally impermissible national 
political identity’ (Cox 2004, p. 401). 
Several critics of IBC have employed this expressive interpretation. Shachar and 
Hirschl argue that ‘[t]he sale and barter of citizenship … nevertheless sends a loud 
message in both law and social ethics about whom the contemporary market-friendly 
state gives priority to in the immigration and naturalisation line and whom it covets 
most as future citizens’ (2014, 247). Tanasoca suggests that selling citizenship would 
have the expressive effect of damaging exiting citizens' self-esteem: ‘[t]he sale 
implicitly equates group membership to a pile of money’ (2018, p. 75). 
At the first instance, a possible response here is that, as Hidalgo argues, ‘any criterion 
that a state uses to regulate access to citizenship expresses the message that this state 
values certain attributes over others’ (2016, p. 232). For example, making it easier for 
nuclear physicists to immigrate communicates the message that the state values 
nuclear physicists more than other kinds of people. As this policy seems permissible, 
selling citizenship should be permissible. Armstrong makes a similar argument for 
the opposite conclusion: he agrees with Shachar that the concern about the expressive 
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effects of selling citizenship is a profound one, but maintains that ‘its implications 
ripple beyond the mere selling of citizenship’, as a policy which makes it easier for 
highly-skilled people to obtain citizenship would have the same effect (Armstrong 
2018, p. 27). 
5.3. Expressive Preference vs Expressive Precondition 
This however, is too quick. Just as the fact that all selection criteria are discriminating 
in the broad sense is not sufficient for determining that all forms of discrimination are 
wrong, the fact that all selection criteria have expressive effects vis-à-vis current 
citizens is not sufficient for determining that they are expressive harms. As it is 
notoriously difficult to establish what precisely is the expressive meaning of a 
particular law, it is important to distinguish between two kinds of attitudes expressed 
by the state when it employs selective criteria immigration and naturalisation policies: 
(1) Expressive Preference: The state expresses the view that it prefers its citizens to be 
X, or to have the traits of X. 
(2) Expressive Precondition: The state expresses the view that being X, or having the 
traits of X, is a necessary precondition for being an equal citizen. 
Once we determine the expressive effect of the law, we can turn to consider its 
permissibility. With the political equality argument, the concern is one of integrity of 
purpose: if the state is not permitted to express a preference for a certain group 
identity or trait X domestically, or establish that X is a precondition for citizenship 
with its own citizens, it is not also permitted to do so towards prospective immigrants.  
With this in mind, consider the difference between three criteria (X), which will serve 
as ideal types:  
(i) Engaging in terrorist activity;  
(ii) Having a criminal record;  
(iii) Being a member of a minority religious group.  
A discretionary immigration policy that excludes members of terrorist organisations 
seems the least objectionable, as it expresses the state's opposition to terrorism which 
is also reflected in domestic security policies, on the one hand, and the expatriation of 
citizens engaged in terrorist activity, on the other hand.14 In comparison, states’ 
exclusion of prospective immigrants with criminal records, or stating that a clean 
criminal record is a requirement for naturalisation, plausibly has the expressive effect 
toward current citizens that engaging in crime are less desired by the state, and that 
                                                 
14 The latter being more controversial, of course, and some have argued that expatriation of terrorists is 
not compatible with democratic conceptions of citizenship. See (Lenard 2018). 
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having a criminal record undermines one's standing as an equal citizen. The first 
attitude is arguably permissible – the state has justifiable reasons to prefer its citizens 
to be law-abiding – while the second is more controversial, as is reflected in debates 
over felon disenfranchisement.15 In comparison, the state’s expressed preference for a 
particular ethnic or religious group is the least justifiable, even if it does not actively 
take away political rights from other groups. It is objectionable on grounds of political 
equality because the state's expressed interest in increasing the share of people from a 
specific religious or ethnic group communicates to others that the state views them as, 
at best, a burden to be tolerated.  
We may disagree on the precise evaluation of each of these criteria, but the point here 
is that any specific criterion may be impermissible given its expressive preference, or 
expressive precondition, or both. When evaluating the compatibility of any selection 
criterion with political equality, it is necessary to determine first, what is its expressive 
effect, and second, whether this would be permissible towards current citizens. 
Consider, for example, selection criteria excluding or penalising people with 
disabilities. Mathew Lindauer argues that incorporating such selection criteria would 
be impermissible on grounds of political equality, as it would express that only able-
bodies people qualify as citizens (Lindauer 2017, pp. 289f).16 This implicitly takes 
immigration selection criteria as expressing a precondition, which would be 
impermissible.   
I argue, conversely, that selective criteria of immigration such as IBC and SBC do not 
have expressive content on the preconditions of citizenship, but only with regards to 
state preference. As MacKay rightly points out with regards to SBC, ‘[s]tates do not 
commit themselves to the claim that unskilled citizens are somehow unfit for political 
membership… They only commit themselves to the claim that skill is valuable and a 
legitimate reason for favoring one prospective immigrant over another, all of whom—
skilled or unskilled—may be fit for political membership’ (2016, p. 135). The point is 
equally valid to other selection criteria, including IBC. Importantly, and as I have 
already argued above, as no state employs a single criterion for admitting immigrants, 
it is difficult to say what is the singular message it conveys about its preconditions for 
citizenship; indeed, it is more plausible to claim that there are several sufficient 
preconditions, and that unlike prospective immigrants, current citizens meet these 
preconditions by virtue of being born to citizens (jus sanguinis) or being born in the 
state's territory (jus soli). 
                                                 
15 For normative defences and objections to the practice, see (Manfredi 1998; Reiman 2005). 
16 Citing approvingly statements opposing such criteria by The Council of Canadians with Disabilities, 
and The Australian organization COTA (formerly the Council on the Ageing), respectively.  
 19 
 
This, however, does not settle the question of whether these criteria are permissible or 
not from the perspective of political equality, since it could be argued that the state's 
expressive preference is impermissible, even domestically. Consider again of the 
example of the religion-based criterion above, which is impermissible even as an 
expressive preference. Can we say the same about IBC or SBC? 
Expressed preference for electrical engineers or computer programmers over 
agricultural or domestic workers arguably carries the message that the state values 
these skills more highly, and considers life spent in the pursuit of academic knowledge 
more valuable (Tannock 2011).17 Is this a permissible attitude? Given prominent views 
of liberal state neutrality, the answer is no: it is impermissible for the state to express 
any value judgement on its citizens' conception of the good life. If we accept this view, 
Shachar is right to argue that SBC are in tension with certain liberal conceptions of 
equal citizenship, albeit not because ‘democratic and egalitarian notions which at least 
formally assign membership to individuals irrespective of how innovative, talented, 
or accomplished they may (or may not) be’ (2016, p. 197), but because liberal 
conceptions of equal citizenship are supposed to be neutral with regards to the value 
of their citizens' conception of the good life. 
Note that this conclusion relies on a very particular understanding of liberal state 
neutrality, which is susceptible to at least three objections. First, one may hold that 
SBC/ IBC violate state neutrality, but that this is a pro tanto concern overridden by the 
social benefits of such policies. Second, one might interpret state neutrality as 
neutrality of justification, and argue that SBC/IBC do not violate neutrality as they can 
be justified through public reason. Finally, one can of course follow a long line of 
perfectionist critics and reject the principle of state neutrality altogether.18  None of 
these positions, however, provide a clear cut distinction between SBC and IBC. 
A surprising upshot of this line of argument is that it holds more strongly for SBC than 
for IBC, at least from within the common arguments of liberal neutralism. The neutral 
liberal state is neutral towards conceptions of the good life, and therefore ought not to 
express its preference of particular professions, skills, or levels of education. But it 
should not be neutral towards primary goods – and income and wealth are, after all, 
primary social goods (Rawls 1971). By expressing a preference towards money, the 
state is not expressing any preference for any particular conception of the good life, 
and thus cannot be said to violate considerations of liberal neutrality. 
                                                 
17 See also (Boucher 2016; Lim forthcoming) on the gender-bias in these evaluations. 
18 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this objection. 
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6. Conclusion 
I have offered a critical analysis of three prominent normative objections to 
investment-based selection criteria for immigrants (IBC), comparing it to skill-based 
criteria (SBC). I have argued that under certain relatively uncontroversial background 
assumptions, either the arguments against IBC fail, or also apply to SBC. To recap the 
analysis:  
(1) The Wrongful Discrimination Objection is either too weak, or also applies 
to SBC, depending on the theory of wrongful discrimination in play. 
(2) The Equality of Opportunity Objection does not apply in our world of plural 
migration routes; otherwise it applies equally to IBC and SBC. 
(3) The Political Equality Objection, if it applies, suggests that SBC are less 
justified than IBC. 
If persuasive, my analysis places us at the horns of a dilemma. The existing objections, 
and the ways to answer them, seem to apply equally to SBC and IBC. Does it entail 
that accepting IBC, or rejecting SBC? Each of these results would have major 
implications. Choosing the first horn would run counter to accepted views in both 
scholarship and public opinion; opting for the latter raises further questions, mainly 
whether there are any permissible selection criteria for discretionary migration, or 
whether states must rely on arbitrary decision mechanisms, such as lotteries.   
There may be ways to avoid this dilemma, of course. One would be to offer new 
arguments for rejecting IBC, which would not equally apply to SBC. Alternatively, 
and more radically, resisting the conclusion of this article may require revisiting, and 
perhaps revising, the background assumptions on which it relies. Since these are 
widespread assumptions in the ethics of migration, that would be a surprising 
outcome. 
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